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Lonergan and Shea on Belief and Knowledge: Positions,
Counter-Positions, and Contexts.
By Dennis M. Doyle

William Shea was my teacher for two academic years at the Catholic University
of America, 1978-80. He had a profound influence on me in several ways, one of which
was introducing me to the work of Bernard Lonergan. He directed the first major paper I
wrote in the field of theology, which later appeared as an article in The Thomist.1
Sometime shortly after my 1984 dissertation became available, a study that focused on
the topic of belief and truth in the works of Lonergan and of Wilfred Cantwell Smith,2
Shea read it. He gave me a compliment that I still treasure, remarking that it was the best
work on Lonergan and belief that he had read to date. (He didn’t mention whether or not
it was also the only one.)
Shea added, though, that there are some serious problems with Lonergan’s
positions on belief, problems that I did not fully engage in my work. He told me that
Lonergan did not address this issue in his usual clear and helpful matter. This was back in
the days when Shea was reporting that he re-read Lonergan’s Insight once a year. He
1

Dennis M. Doyle, “The Symbolic Element in Belief: An Alternative to Tillich,” The Thomist 45 (1981)
449-72.
2
Dennis M. Doyle, The Distinction between Faith and Belief and the Question of Religious Trutch: The
Contributions of Bernard Lonergan and Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Ph.D. Dissertation. (Ann Arbor, MI:
University Microfilms International, 1984). This work was directed by William P. Loewe.

agreed wholeheartedly with the first eighteen chapters (on understanding, knowing, and
metaphysics), took very seriously the nineteenth chapter (on general theological
categories such as the existence of God), and took issue with some of the positions
expressed in chapter twenty (on special theological categories such as belief in doctrines
particular to a specific religious tradition).
I have in more recent years written a book on the subject of communion
ecclesiology.3 I have promoted the use of communion ecclesiology in Catholic circles
insofar as it operates as a broad-ranging, highly inclusive category that serves to integrate
and implement various elements of a balanced reading of the vision of Vatican II.
Although the word “communion” was used in the preconciliar period in a juridical
manner,4 the present term “communion ecclesiology” is intended to name the multifaceted shift away from juridical tendencies toward an appreciation of various types and
levels of personal and liturgically-ordered relationships at the heart of the Church. For
Catholics, communion ecclesiology names our relationship of love with God and with
each other as the primary reality of what the church is. Juridical structures are essential
but secondary; they must remain always in the service of loving relationships.
Shea cites my work on communion ecclesiology at the end of the following
passage of his 2004 The Lion and the Lamb:
. . . American evangelical anti-modernism remained fiercely egalitarian while the
Roman Catholic response was just as fiercely authoritarian. Where the Protestant
critics of modernism lost control of denominational assemblies and bureaucracies,
the Catholic Church became even more Roman than it has been in terms of the
3

Dennis M. Doyle, Communion Ecclesiology: Vision and Versions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2000).
Joseph A. Komonchak, “Concepts of Communion: Past and Present,” Cristianesimo nella storia 16
(1995) 321-340.
4

subjection of the local churches to the papal offices and commissions.
“Subsidiarity” as a principle of Catholic life became, and continues to be, an
ideologized “communion” with centralized authority.5
In a footnote to this passage Shea says that in my book I give an account of the metaphor
of “communion” and its role in Catholic ecclesiology from Möhler to John Paul II.6
I think it fair to say that Shea takes communion ecclesiology to be a theology at
best critically shaping, and at worst supporting, an ideology, one that continues to justify
Roman centralism and authoritarianism. That he cites my Communion Ecclesiology as
support for his own position I interpret not as a misreading of my work but rather as a
friendly poke with a wink of the eye from one Irish-American to another. In this earthly
realm, we of Irish descent value scholarly accuracy greatly, subordinating it only to the
need for wit, sarcasm, and the leveling of the high and mighty.
I do agree and argue clearly in my book that the term “communion ecclesiology”
can and sometimes does function somewhat in the way Shea says that it does. In my
judgment, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s 1992 document, “Some
Aspects of the Church Understood as a Communion,” leans a bit in this direction. It tends
to be centralizing, top-heavy, and one-sided, though, in my judgment, nowhere near to
the extreme that would justify Shea’s remarks. Communion ecclesiology is used as a
label not only by the CDF but also by a wide range of theological voices today. Where
Shea sees in communion ecclesiology support for an ideology, I see a theological
approach designed, despite its potential for misuse, to move Catholics beyond ideology.

5

William M. Shea, The Lion and the Lamb: Evangelicals and Catholics in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 50.
6
Ibid., 325 (note 74).

Where Shea sees in communion ecclesiology a continuation of the same old juridicism, I
see a path beyond juridicism.
I am inclined to think that the differences between Shea’s position and my own
are connected not only with practical judgments concerning the present state of the
Catholic Church and its hierarchy but also with the ways in which we understand
“belief.” I think further that the ways in which we understand belief are connected to
where we stand concerning Lonergan’s positions on the topic, including not only issues
that Lonergan attempted to resolve, but also some issues that he left unaddressed.

Shea, Lonergan, and Belief

Shea’s differences with Bernard Lonergan on the matter of religious belief are
related to Shea’s serious concerns about religious dogmatism.
Shea cannot stand dogmatism in any way, shape, or form.7 Dogmatists are people
who, though they should know better, hold beliefs uncritically. There is a difference
between what one knows and what one believes. If one pretends to know what one only
believes, one is a dogmatist unfit for serious dialogue with human beings who do not
happen to be members of one’s own tribe.
There is an equal and opposite intellectual heresy. I do not know if Shea or
anyone gives it a precise name, but Shea clearly discusses it. It is a form of reductionism.
It arises when a philosopher, sometimes one of naturalist persuasions, pretends to treat
religious believers and their religious beliefs respectfully while at the same time declaring

7

Shea, The Naturalists and the Supernatural: Studies in Horizon and an American Philosophy of Religion
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 198; 216; 235.

those beliefs to be meaningful but not true.8 So, even as Shea is steadfastly rejecting
dogmatism in all of its guises, he is just as steadfastly defending the cognitive and
intentional nature of religious beliefs as claims to truth and the existential reality that
believers believe their beliefs to be true.
Shea defines his terms in a manner that differs from Lonergan, with
reverberations that go beyond the semantic to the conceptual and to the real. For Shea,
either one knows or one believes. For Lonergan, there are two kinds of knowledge:
immanently generated knowledge and belief. In other words, belief is preeminently a type
of knowledge. Immanently generated knowledge is knowledge that one has found out for
oneself without relying on the testimony of others. Belief can be distinguished from
immanently generated knowledge, but it remains a type of knowledge. This approach is
present in Insight9 and more fully developed in Method in Theology.10
Lonergan’s treatment of knowledge of God in chapter nineteen in Insight and
even more so his treatment of particular beliefs such as the Incarnation and the Trinity as
types of knowledge in chapter twenty fly in the face of modern presuppositions that such
beliefs decidedly do not constitute a type of knowledge. Regarding religious belief as a
type of knowledge is an essential yet controversial dimension of the entire project that
Insight undertakes.
In Method in Theology, a progression from immanently generated knowledge to
belief undergirds the entire enterprise. In-between the first four functional specialties and
the final four stands conversion. Lonergan discusses conversion in a threefold manner as

8

Ibid., 163-69; 193-202.
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study in Human Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library,
1957).
10
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).
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religious, moral, and intellectual. Through conversion one achieves the horizon necessary
for accepting and understanding religious truths that have been handed down over the
centuries. One does so within the context of a community that is constituted by those
particular religious meanings and values. As Shea himself brought out so forcefully in
response to John Randall, believers hold their beliefs to be not just meaningful but true.11
That religious believers hold their beliefs to be not just meaningful but true is a
constitutive part of the act of believing. To reduce religious believing to the holding of
the merely meaningful is to do an injustice to the reality of the act.
Shea strongly agrees with Lonergan on this particular point about the cognitive
status and intentionality of religious belief. Shea’s difference from Lonergan lies in his
refusal to call religious belief knowledge, and in his finding the uncritical treatment of
religious belief as knowledge to constitute the cardinal sin of dogmatism.
It would be too easy and indeed false to say that Shea must take Lonergan to be a
dogmatist because Lonergan claims to know what he only believes. Shea is aware that
Lonergan adopts at least somewhat of a critical stance toward belief and that he grounds
authentic belief in religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. In a Lonerganian
perspective, one’s appropriation of religious beliefs into one’s present context cannot
contradict things that one knows, for example, as immanently generated knowledge. Shea
instead finds Lonergan to lack full coherence and consistency on the topic.
Shea is not alone in offering this assessment. In an essay given at a conference in
1970, two years before the publication of Method in Theology, David Tracy raised some

11

Shea, Naturalists, 195-204.

similar questions.12 Writing with an awareness of Lonergan’s previous works on dogma
as well as his developing work on conversion, Tracy expressed concerns over whether
Lonergan would be able to use a category such as conversion to ground religious belief in
a sufficiently critical manner. In later writings, Tracy came to affirm strongly the critical
nature of Lonergan’s method, though he still retained reservations concerning Lonergan’s
content.13
On the one hand, Lonergan’s life-long project entailed an embrace of the
scientific revolution and the Enlightenment insofar as they could be pursued within an
intellectual approach that honored traditional religious belief. On the other hand,
Lonergan’s project entailed an embrace of traditional religious beliefs insofar as they
would continue to develop as they were appropriated within the new context that values
scientific and historical methods.
In a manner that offers some parallels to Lonergan yet also striking differences,
Shea, in a 1992 Commonweal piece, opts for dual loyalties to Enlightenment tradition and
to Catholic tradition, expressly hoping to avoid the serious dangers that can arise when
one attempts to serve two masters.14 In his vigorous reply to Robert Imbelli’s response to
his article on this subject, Shea states: “While I regard myself as Christologically
orthodox as the next Catholic, I also regard myself as one who believes and therefore
does not know, and whose belief is always poised on the edge of unbelief.”15
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David W. Tracy, “Lonergan’s Foundational Theology: an Interpretation and a Critique,” in Foundations
of Theology: Papers from the International Lonergan Congress 1970, ed. Philip McShane (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 197-222, esp. 214-222.
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See David W. Tracy, “Theological Models: An Exercise in Dialectics,” in Lonergan Workshop, v. 2, ed.
Fred Lawrence (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981) 83-107, esp. fn.. 4 on 106 and fn. 9 on 107.
14
William M. Shea, “Dual Loyalties in Catholic Theology: Finding Truth in Alien Traditions,”
Commonweal, 31 January 1992, pp. 9-14, at 9.
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Robert P. Imbelli and William M. Shea, “Dual Loyalties in Catholic Theology: An Exchange of Views,”
Commonweal, 24 April 1992, pp. 21-23, at 22.

It is precisely this disjunction between knowledge and belief that differentiates
Shea from Lonergan. Lonergan holds that, from the perspective of a sociology of
knowledge, most human knowledge rests on belief:

Ninety-eight per cent of what a genius knows, he believes. It isn’t personally
independently acquired knowledge. Human knowledge is an acquisition that goes
on over centuries and centuries, and if we want to accept nothing, that we don’t
find out for ourselves, we revert to the palaeozoic age. At that period they found
out for themselves everything they knew.16

Lonergan’s argument against the disjunction between knowledge and belief rests on the
claim that the Enlightenment bias in favor of immanently generated knowledge
represents an individualistic and rationalistic misreading of the human phenomenon of
knowing. Lonergan explains:

Human knowledge results from a vast collaboration of many peoples over
uncounted millennia. The necessary condition of that collaboration is belief. What
any of us knows, only slightly results from personal experience, personal
discovery, personally conducted verification; for the most part it results from
believing. But the eighteenth century Enlightenment was not content to attack
religious belief. It prided itself on its philosophers. It set up a rationalist
individualism that asked people to prove their assumptions or else regard them as

16

Bernard J.F. Lonergan, A Second Collection, eds. William F. J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrrell
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 219.

arbitrary. In effect it was out to destroy not only the religious tradition but all
traditions. Such rationalist individualism in the twentieth century seems to have
infected our educationalists. Students are encouraged to find things out for
themselves, to develop originality, to be creative, to criticize, but it does not seem
that they are instructed in the enormous role of belief in the acquisition and
expansion of knowledge. Many do not seem to be aware that what they know of
science is not immanently generated but for the most part simply belief.17

Lonergan’s concern here runs somewhat counter to some of the concerns
expressed by Shea in his “dual loyalties” article in Commonweal, especially the final two
of six points he outlined:

5. All traditions and authorities are subject to the test of experience, and all are
subject to criticism, including the Enlightenment values and the Christian
tradition and its teachings. That obligation is individual as well as communal.
Kant is correct: one must assume responsibility for one’s beliefs and questions as
well as one’s actions.
6. Faith is not only fides quaerens intellectum, it is also intellectus quaerens
fidem. Here I would interpret the first to means that theology proceeds from faith
and is a reflection on its meaning; and the second, to mean that in the modern
context, belief is always accompanied by questions about its truth and these
questions accompany the act of reflection from beginning to end, questions which
are not finally answered. In every instance theology must take account of its
17

Lonergan, Second Collection,185-86.

unbelief as well as its belief. The Enlightenment criticism of traditional theology
is correct: ecclesiastical dogmatism makes genuine faith and belief impossible.18

Although one might argue that Shea fits Lonergan’s description of the contemporary
educator infected by rationalist individualism, I myself would find such an argument to
be more than a little exaggerated. My point in juxtaposing the above quotes is rather to
show how Lonergan and Shea appear to have contrasting agendas in their treatments of
belief in relation to Enlightenment-style biases.
Lonergan is arguing against any approach to human knowing that shoves belief
off to the margins as merely personal and subjective. Shea is arguing against any
approach that allows belief to escape critical scrutiny. Lonergan is arguing against
rationalists who do not take seriously the cognitive status of beliefs as truth claims. Shea
is arguing against dogmatists who refuse to consider legitimate and necessary questions
regarding their beliefs. Both Lonergan and Shea know that there is a distinction to be
made between immanently generated knowledge and belief. Lonergan pursues his agenda
by stressing the continuity between the two. Shea pursues his agenda by stressing the
difference.
Even in their agendas there is quite a bit of overlap, however, for we have seen
that Shea also argues against rationalists who do not take seriously the cognitive status of
beliefs as truth claims. Lonergan himself argues against dogmatists who refuse to
consider legitimate and necessary questions regarding their beliefs. Both of them are
fighting battles on both of these fronts. Why is it, then, that whereas Lonergan thinks that

18

Shea, “Dual Loyalties,” 12.

identifying belief as a type of knowledge helps in these battles, Shea thinks that only a
clear and decisive distinction between belief and knowledge will do?
Such a question can perhaps be addressed by engaging in dialectics and in horizon
analysis. These are the Lonerganian tools that Shea himself employed in The Naturalists
and the Supernatural. Dialectics helps one to determine philosophically what are
“positions” and what are “counter-positions.”19 Horizon analysis helps one to determine
at what point further legitimate questions are either being pursued or shut down.
Dialectics and horizon analysis are related insofar as ultimately “positions” will lead to
pursuing further legitimate questions and “counter-positions” will lead to shutting them
down.
Put simply, a “position” will be neither reductive nor uncritical. Skepticism—the
claim that one really cannot know anything for certain—is the purest form of
reductionism. It is a highly critical posture in its stance that all claims must be thoroughly
examined and justified. It is reductionist, however, insofar as it assumes that knowing is
something like looking at an “already out there now real”; in realizing correctly that one
cannot truly achieve knowledge in that way, skepticism rejects the possibility of human
knowing whatsoever. Lonergan’s “position” is that knowing is not only possible but an
everyday reality. It issues from a process that involves experience, understanding, and
judgment. Objectivity is reached not as some purely abstract ideal but as the fruit of
authentic subjectivity. Knowing what knowing is helps one to be critical of what passes
for human knowledge. The skeptic shuts down further questions that the knowing subject
is free to pursue.

19

Lonergan’s exposition of “position” and “counter-position” can be found in Insight, 387-390.

Cartesian dualism contains a “position” insofar as it builds its epistemology upon
a turn to the knowing subject. It contains also a “counter-position” insofar as it identifies
the knowable as that segment of the “already out there now real” about which one’s
doubts can be overcome. It is a form of rationalism insofar as it bases itself in a posture
of radical doubt. Critical reason cut off from faith provides the starting point and ending
point for the pursuit of knowledge.
Fideism—based on the claim that one cannot offer any rationale or justification
for one’s beliefs for, after all, they are based on faith—is the purest form of being
uncritical. Fideism and dogmatism go hand in hand. Lonergan holds the “position” that,
whereas believing is indeed based in faith, one can still give an account of one’s faith and
of one’s beliefs that is credible and that operates in accordance with legitimate canons of
rationality. Legitimate canons of rationality differ from those put forth by skeptics,
idealists, and absolutists.
A “position” concerning belief, therefore, must be neither a rationalism nor a
fideism. It can be neither reductionist nor insufficiently critical. A believer, at least an
educated one, should be able to give an account of why one is neither a rationalist nor a
fideist. In the large world of the academy, one could find those who might think that Shea
is himself a fideist, and that Lonergan is much worse. In the large world of the church,
one could find those who might think that Lonergan is a rationalist, and that Shea is even
worse. In a dialectical comparison in which the positions of Shea and Lonergan form the
poles, however, it is evident that Lonergan is the one called upon to give an account of
why, relative to Shea, he is not a fideist, and Shea is called upon to give an account of
why, relative to Lonergan, he is not a rationalist. Is Lonergan being sufficiently critical?

Does Shea’s insistence on the need for continual critical scrutiny shut down rather than
open up horizons for understanding the nature and grasping the truth of religious beliefs?

Horizon Analysis
It may perhaps strike one as ironic, against the background of everything that has
been said previously, that a major difference between Lonergan and Shea can be
explained in terms of Lonergan treating religious beliefs in a way that is radically distinct
from other forms of knowledge and Shea treating them as if they were basically the same.
Such, however, is the case.
For Lonergan, when it comes to the basic human acquisition of knowledge,
understanding precedes judgment. The knower must grasp a range of possible
understandings prior to making a judgment concerning what is or is not so. Meaning in
this case is prior to truth. When it comes to religious belief, however, judgment and truth
precede understanding and meaning. Moreover, the believer can legitimately accept as
true things which will not be fully understood within one’s time upon this earth.
Religious believers even anticipate and expect that things that they now see as through a
glass, darkly, will appear quite differently when they are able to see face to face.
Some of the differences between Shea and Lonergan can be understood by
considering that Shea is operating as a philosopher/historian of religion whereas
Lonergan, in Insight as well as in Method in Theology, is covering a span that does not
stop at philosophy of religion but which explicitly lays the groundwork for theology. In
The Naturalists and the Supernatural, Shea reflected on the apparent convergence
between philosophy and theology. On the one hand, a philosopher like Dewey himself

paid serious attention to the type of experience “that especially accompanies significant
adjustment or reorientation in life.”20 One could hardly consider his philosophy to be
“pre-conversion” in any general sense. On the other hand, as theology was developing as
a critical discipline in the academy, it was growing closer in its methods and criteria to its
more traditionally academic siblings.21 Yet both naturalist philosophers and theologians
hold to be true things which, from a philosophical perspective, are assumptions and
beliefs rather than what Dewey calls “warrantedly assertible propositions.”22
And so Shea proposes in his conclusion that both naturalists and theologians
swear off any tendencies toward dogmatism, exercise abundant self-criticism, and engage
in respectful conversation. Shea encourages both sides to continue to put forth their most
basic beliefs as claims to truth; at the same time, he wants both sides to acknowledge that
there is a difference between what they believe and what they know. Naturalists should
continue to be critically minded, but they should be more open to the intellectual horizon
that would permit the question of God as a legitimate and serious one. Theologians need
to become more critically minded.
So Shea is raising questions about the distinction between philosophy and
theology in two directions. First, are philosophers really limited to something called
philosophy? Second, are theologians really operating in some sublime realm that is
identifiably post-conversion? Shea’s questions point to the fact that for many reasons and
in many ways, any contemporary distinction between philosophy and theology is
complex and poses potential ambiguities.
20

Shea, Naturalists, 124. In class at Catholic University Shea stressed the biographical angle of the
importance of Dewey’s own naturalist conversion experience for the direction and energy it gave to his
life’s work.
21
Ibid., 229.
22
As quoted in Shea, Naturalists, 233.

Lonergan did not limit his Method in Theology to Roman Catholic theologians. It
has implications for various Christian communions.23 It may potentially have something
to say to thinkers of other religious faiths. Moreover, if one can identify ways in which a
philosopher is operating in a post-conversion manner, accepting as basic truths
assumptions that cannot be empirically verified but which are grounded in a conversion,
then that philosopher can be taken to no longer be engaged in philosophy only on the
level that Lonergan labels dialectics but rather to be doing something more parallel to
theology. In the other direction, a theologian whose functional specialty may be
dogmatics or systematics, if operating within the context of a university, is not exempt
from the responsibility of addressing critical questions in the most academically
responsible manner possible.
In The Lion and the Lamb there is perhaps some degree of change in emphasis
evident in Shea’s stance regarding the relationship between, on the one hand,
philosophy/history of religion and, on the other hand, theology. Most of his underlying
concepts and positions remain the same as in his earlier works. Shea will at times speak
explicitly as a believer in The Lion and the Lamb, but his intellectual analysis of his
material and of the groups he studies are expressly not undertaken as the work of a
Catholic theologian. Shea is no longer explicitly emphasizing a convergence of
philosophy and theology. He finds much of the work on the topic of Christian
fundamentalism done by Catholic theologians and church leaders to be lacking in
empathetic understanding, riddled with prejudice, and unscholarly.24 He implies that such
is what happens when people act as if they know what they really only believe.

23
24

Lonergan, Method, xii.
Shea, Lion, 241-78, esp. p. 268 and p. 278.

Shea personally found his move from being a priest-theologian to being a lay
Catholic scholar of religion to be liberating. He testifies: “Although I had and still have
admiration for the work done by my theologian colleagues at Catholic University of
America, I was and remain unable to place myself and my own work as a part of a
Christian mission or as in any way representative of the teaching magisterium of the
Catholic Church.”25 Rather than calling for theology to retain a critical stance at every
moment, as he did in the Commonweal piece cited above, Shea has backed away from
claiming to do Catholic theology.
I recall being on a panel of scholars responding to The Naturalists and the
Supernatural at a College Theology Society meeting in 1987.26 The panel was given in a
session of the Philosophy of Religion section. My own points focused on what Shea
wrote about Catholic theology, noting especially the lack of an explicit role for the
magisterium. Shea seemed to think that, given the overall thrust of his book, my question
was a bit beside the main point. He did, though, support the importance of theology
being a critical discipline, which made the role of the magisterium somewhat less
relevant than some take it to be. Such are my vague memories. The Lion and the Lamb
addresses the concerns I expressed way back when in a much more direct way than did
Shea’s response to me on that panel.
I want to speak about Shea’s academic horizon in relation to the status of
religious belief in two ways. First, if one were to consider Shea’s academic stance as
basically pre-conversion and pre-confessional, operating mainly within the functional
specialties that Lonergan labels “history” and “dialectics,” then one might see a special
25

Ibid., 282.
Dennis M. Doyle, “Response to William M. Shea's The Naturalists and the Supernatural.” College
Theology Society annual meeting at Loyola in Baltimore, May 31, 1987.
26

appropriateness to insisting on a strong distinction between knowledge and belief on
those levels. Shea is operating on a level in which understanding precedes judgment and
in which meaning precedes truth. The critical function needs to be continually operative
on these levels.
I think such an analysis says something, but there is more to be said. A second
way to consider Shea’s stance is as one that is to some degree confessional and postconversion. Shea rightfully feels the need to tell his story as an element of what one
needs to know in order to understand him and where he is coming from. His movement
from being an ecclesiastical theologian to becoming a lay Catholic scholar of religion
entailed a type of conversion. A central chunk of the message that Shea hands on has to
do with the need to reject religious dogmatism in all its forms. Shea teaches the need to
be both scholarly and empathetic toward others and never to surrender the call to be ever
critically minded, especially when it comes to taking the intellectual plank out of one’s
own eye. Maintaining a sharp distinction between belief and knowledge fits well within
such a vision. Shea remains a Catholic not only religiously but in all dimensions, even as
his own intellectual conversion runs somewhat parallel to rather than within the
mainstream of official Catholic theology.
The extent to which a Catholic theologian acts as an official representative of the
magisterium, the extent to which a Catholic theologian can operate in a manner that is
autonomous without declaring complete independence, the manner in which magisterial
teaching functions as a theological source without predetermining theological
conclusions, these are all complex matters. Lonergan addresses these questions in a
somewhat cursory way in Method in Theology in the last few pages of his chapter on

doctrines. He voices there his support for recognizing doctrinal development as well as
the autonomy of the theologian. It is in this context that Lonergan himself offers a kind of
personal witness: “Though a Roman Catholic with quite conservative views on religious
and church doctrines, I have written a chapter on doctrines without subscribing to any but
the doctrine about doctrine set forth in the First Vatican Council. I have done so
deliberately, and my purpose has been ecumenical. I desire it to be as simple as possible
for theologians of different allegiance to adapt my method to their uses.”27
In the paragraph that follows, Lonergan explains how it is that the method he lays
out for theology is critical rather than dogmatic:
Finally, a distinction between dogmatic theology and doctrinal theology may
serve to bring to focus points that repeatedly we have attempted to make.
Dogmatic theology is classicist. It tends to take it for granted that on each issue
there is one and only one true proposition. It is out to determine which of the
unique propositions are true. In contrast, doctrinal theology is historically-minded.
It knows that the meaning of a proposition becomes determinate only within a
context. It knows that contexts vary with the varying brands of common sense,
with the evolution of cultures, with the differentiations of human consciousness,
and with the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, and religious
conversion.28
Lonergan goes on to distinguish between religious apprehension of a doctrine and
theological apprehension of that same doctrine. Religious apprehension is in the context
of “one’s own brand of commonsense” and in accordance with one’s pursuit of

27
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Lonergan, Method, 332-33.
Ibid., 333.

intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Theological apprehension is historical and
dialectical. One tries to develop “positions” to reverse any “counter-positions” that one
might encounter. Theologians appropriate the truth and meaning of those doctrines which
had been in place in one context to a new context.
For Lonergan, one accepts the basic truths of the core doctrines of one’s religion
upon achieving the horizon that allows one to belong to that religion. Critical thinking
does not end at that point, however. Critical appropriation of the truths of the tradition is
in a way just beginning. The theologian is obliged to transpose truths that used to be
understood in one historical/cultural frame of reference into a contemporary frame of
reference. Though in a basic sense the “truth” of basic doctrines is not in question, the
meaning of doctrines, and thus how those doctrines are understood, may shift
significantly from one context to another. The meaning of doctrines must be appropriated
in accordance with one’s religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. Moreover, even
though a particular theologian may operate within the functional specialty of doctrines or
of systematics, that theologian is not to work in a manner that becomes cut off from the
fruits of the efforts of those working in other functional specialties. Lonergan is
promoting doctrinal development to an extent which, when compared to the theological
approach used in Catholic seminary education in the first half of the twentieth century,
can be appreciated as relatively radical.
Shea knows this and probably for the most part agrees with it. Even if one can
show that Lonergan’s method, used properly by one who has a deep grasp of its
implications, can function in a thoroughly critical manner, one is still left with the

question of why Lonergan identifies belief as a form of knowledge. Why not fess up that
believing and knowing are quite distinct?
In my judgment, in a Lonerganian perspective, to deny in one’s first pass that
belief is a type of knowledge represents a counter-position. A “position” requires one to
affirm the fullest range of reality that there is to be known. Once one establishes that
belief is a type of knowledge, one is then not only free but actually obliged to go about
the act of believing responsibly. One must be critically minded about it, at least if one is
educated or even perhaps a theologian. One must believe in ways that accord with one’s
religious, moral, and intellectual conversion. One must believe in ways that do not stand
in contradiction with other things that one knows. One must believe in ways that are
technically open to the possibility of revision, even in some cases on the level not just of
meaning but of truth. For if one happens to encounter strong evidence that what one has
accepted as true may not be true, one is obliged to pursue the relevant questions as they
arise. This is a “position” that is neither reductionist nor uncritical.
To begin with the premise that belief is not a type of knowledge results in a form
of reductionism. For belief functions in an everyday manner as a form of knowledge
within a community of believers. It is proper to live one’s life within the context of such a
community without having to critically question the community’s core beliefs at every
moment. One should not begin and end every prayer or discussion group meeting in a
parish with the acknowledgment that after all, we only believe these things, we don’t
really know them for sure in the way we hold real knowledge. Theologians working in
universities need to be much more academically responsible and critical than most
believers in a parish setting. Still, much of their work flows from and contributes to such

faith communities. Once it is settled that religious belief is a form of knowledge, the
critical questions for the theologian may begin. It is ultimately a form of skepticism to
rule out the possibility of knowing anything through faith and belief.
As discussed earlier, Lonergan makes the point that most of what anyone knows
is in some sense based on belief. If one has never been to Toronto, in a sense one
“believes” that Toronto exists and that it can be found where it is placed on virtually all
maps of Canada. Yet everyone trusts that for someone with the means to travel, Toronto
could be personally discovered to exist in that place. The existence of Toronto would
then become immanently generated knowledge for that person and no longer “belief.”
Yet anyone can also see that it is so reasonable for a person to trust that Toronto
does in fact exist in that place, there is really no need to verify it personally. Though
technically “belief,” it was already knowledge before the foolish and unnecessary
journey. In fact, if someone were to start correcting people every time they acted as if
they knew that Toronto exists in that place even though for them it is not immanently
generated knowledge, that someone would be extraordinarily annoying. And if that
someone were to take this beyond Toronto and start correcting people in each instance
that they acted as if they knew something that was not personally immanently generated
knowledge, that someone would be absolutely unbearable.
There is an obvious objection to this line of argument. The existence of Toronto
in that place is relatively easy to verify empirically. Religious beliefs for the most part are
not. The analogy thus appears to break down. One who questions the existence of
Toronto is being ridiculous. One who questions the reliability of religious beliefs is
swimming in the current of the deepest streams in our culture.

Lonergan is fighting against the cultural assumption that religious belief is
fundamentally subjective and personal in a manner that cuts it off from the question of
truth. There is plenty of evidence in Lonergan’s work that he knew well the basic and
obvious distinction between religious belief and most other forms of belief. He goes to
great lengths to explain how intellectual verification of the truth of religious beliefs
requires both the self-appropriation of one’s self as a knower as well as a significant
existential component. Lonergan’s philosophical and theological agenda leads him to
emphasize that religious beliefs function in religious communities as a type of
knowledge, and it is not in the interest of truth or goodness to place radical doubt at the
core of one’s apprehension of such beliefs either religiously or theologically.
With that in place, further questions calling for critical analysis will indeed arise.
Religious communities, however, need to be affirmed in their ability to pursue deeper
understanding of the core doctrines that they accept as true. For Lonergan, the conversion
that underlies the life of a religious community goes far beyond the individual and the
present. There is also the conversion that belongs to the group and that has been growing
and developing over many centuries.29 Theologians pursue further understanding of
beliefs accepted as knowledge not just as individuals but as members of these believing
communities. To insist that belief and knowledge are simply two different things inhibits
this line of questioning and represents a narrower horizon than that opened up by the
insight that belief functions legitimately as a type of knowledge. To point out that belief
functions legitimately as a type of knowledge does not shut down any lines of
questioning for those who want to make further distinctions. In this regard, it is Lonergan
who offers the “position.”
29
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Can These Differences Be Understood as Being Complementary?
So, do I then dismiss Shea as the one who offers merely a “counter-position” on
the relationship between belief and knowledge? Although I do think that I have
uncovered a serious difference in Lonergan’s favor when it comes to this point of
comparison, I find that the relevant questions do not end at this point.
Tracy has pointed out that Lonergan’s work was directed toward “a liberation . . .
of theological method from the increasingly dead weight of Neo-scholasticism.”30 He
adds that “much of Lonergan’s work is concerned with the challenges posed by
modernity from the scientific revolution through the modern turn to the subject and the
rise of historical consciousness.”31 Yet many of the challenges of more recent years are
posed by what is labeled “postmodern.” Tracy notes that Lonergan’s work has been used
by some postmodern thinkers. He then explores Lonergan’s emphasis on performing
exercises for the self-appropriation of oneself as a knower as a dimension that lends itself
fruitfully toward a postmodern approach. Tracy even reconsiders the central role that
Lonergan gives to belief as a kind of knowledge. When viewed in conjunction with
Lonergan’s engagement with modernity, Tracy sees this central role for belief as
reflecting Lonergan’s interest at that time in a sociology of knowledge. In a postmodern
perspective, however, Tracy judges the centrality granted to belief to be “exactly the kind
of role that true beliefs possessed for the ancients: true beliefs are worthwhile principally
because they are expressive of those true judgments of value implied by the fundamental
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orientation of an authentic tradition of values, grounded in a vision of ultimate reality as
good.”32
To some degree Lonergan’s ways of meeting the challenges of modernity spill
over into what is today recognized as postmodern. The theological method that he
proposed may not directly meet all of the standards championed by the modern mind
because it is meant as much to challenge those demands as to meet them.
Shea’s own use of the category “postmodern” in The Lion and Lamb differs
greatly from the positive way in which Tracy uses it. Shea states:
In its latest phase, post-Enlightenment or postmodernism, the Enlightenment
reaches another stage in its development wherein all claims to truth, even its own,
are affirmed to be relative to context. All knowing, including science, and moral
evaluation are seen to be shaped in traditions and so are subjective, historical, and
contextual, and permeated by ideology. The contribution of postmodernism in
correcting the Enlightenment-modernist myth is cognitive and moral relativism.
Surpassing the vigor of the modernist forms of criticism, postmodernism is
doubly opposed to uncritical and obscurantist traditional religions with their
claims to unconditioned truth and their service to power.33

It may prove worthwhile, however, to consider Shea against the background of
the category of postmodernity when taken in the positive sense that Tracy gives it. Shea
identifies himself as one who struggles to bring together the often contrasting legacies of
modernity and the Catholic intellectual tradition. It is now twenty years since my last
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reading of The Naturalists and the Supernatural. I found it to be of great personal interest
in the last two pages of Shea’s first chapter, though it does not use the term
“postmodern,” briefly raises a series of questions that today are recognizably associated
with postmodern thought. He says that his approach may be considered foundationalist in
some senses but not all; that he indeed recognizes that he can be interpreted as an
apologist for his own intellectual beliefs; and that the moves he makes are not a retreat to
the pre-critical but are rather quite contemporary.
Shea’s critique of dogmatism has some parallels with the critiques that some
postmodern thinkers make of the misuse of meta-narratives. His goal of promoting
serious and humble dialogue can be understood as taking the turn toward the “other.” His
life-long stress on the subjectivity of the theologian can be read as taking seriously the
particular and the contextual. Most relevant to this discussion, Shea’s pursuit of a “bothand” position on the question of truth and openness finds echoes throughout the
postmodern world.
The quest has been long underway among religious thinkers self-consciously
responding to the challenges of postmodernism to find a way to talk about simultaneously
holding one’s community’s truths as truths and being radically open to the other.
Miroslav Volf, self-described as representing a “free church” perspective, puts it as
follows:
Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, and the life. As Christians we will assert this as
the truth. But we cannot assert it as absolute knowledge, we cannot assert it as the
final truth. Short of becoming God, humans cannot possess the final truth. . . . All
Christian beliefs are our beliefs, human beliefs, and as such always provisional

beliefs. We assert that they are true; but we make this assertion provisionally. I
call this provisional certitude. There is, if you want, an absoluteness about our
beliefs: we cannot relinquish our standpoint but rather assert that it is true. So the
ground on which we stand as we act and reflect is firm. Yet we assert our
standpoint as true in a provisional way: we believe our belief to be true. This
hinders us from becoming arrogant and oppressive.34
Other examples of contemporary scholars of religion struggling to articulate a both/and
position concerning the tension between truth and radical openness include the works of
Lieven Boeve (metanarratives open to interruption) and S. Mark Heim (orientational
pluralism).35 Shea stands in good company with those who want both to affirm the truth
of their beliefs and to avoid any sense of arrogance or dogmatism in regard to others.
I do think that Lonergan’s explanation of how belief functions as a kind of
knowledge can aid rather than inhibit the continual quest for truth and openness. Shea’s
characterization of the Church as an ideologized communion with centralized authority,
though not lacking completely in veracity, reflects a reductionism that does not
appreciate fully how the Church is first of all a communion of love between God and
human beings, and how the role of belief, taken as the knowledge of what God has most
graciously revealed to us, plays an indispensable role in constituting that community.
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It will be a difficult task, but maybe if a few scholars work on it, we can get Shea
to believe that he is really a postmodernist. It is less likely, though, that we could get him
to admit that if he truly believes it, in a way he kind of knows it.

